One of the most litigious questions of the modern arbitration jurisprudence in India has been the determination of the seat of arbitration. The seat, not merely a geographical factor, has legal implications as it defines the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts over an arbitration proceeding.
Let’s take an example, a contract names Mumbai as the ‘venue’, gives Delhi courts ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ and somewhere else refers vaguely to the ‘place of arbitration’ as Chandigarh. Three terms, three cities, one contract and yet no clarity on which court actually has the authority to supervise the arbitration proceedings.
These situations are not hypothetical, this is the reality of the single most litigated issue in Indian arbitration practice today, and it decides something that matters enormously: which court gets to supervise the arbitration, and ultimately enforce or set aside the award. The complexity further increases when “seat”, “venue”, “jurisdiction” and “place” are used interchangeably.
We hence, try to analyse these complexities here to understand who ultimately has the jurisdiction over arbitral proceedings.
Seat, Venue, Place and Jurisdiction: Getting the Vocabulary Straight
Section 20 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996[i] (herein referred to as “the 1996 act”) gives parties the freedom to agree on the “place” of arbitration. Courts have since interpreted this word to carry two different meanings depending on context:
- “seat”, which determines the court that will supervise arbitration proceedings and the law governing the arbitral process,[ii] and
- “venue”, which is often nothing more than the physical location convenient for hearings and need not have any legal consequence at all.[iii]
“Jurisdiction”, is a separate concept that determines which court has the power to take decisions,[iv] an exclusive jurisdiction clause on the other hand specifies which court has the “sole” jurisdiction to handle the disputes. It may or may not have anything to do with where the arbitration is seated. So, there can be agreements mentioning only exclusive jurisdiction, but not the seat of arbitration or vice-versa. Usually, the designated seat of arbitration is treated as vesting exclusive jurisdiction in that court.
The Law Commission of India in its 176th Report published in 2001, undertook a detailed study on the conundrum surrounding the absence of specific provisions relating to the ‘seat of arbitration’, which has resulted in the inability of the parties to attain efficient execution of arbitration awards or attain interim orders in relation to the arbitration seats outside the Indian jurisdiction. In view of this, the Commission recommended inclusion of the term within the Indian Arbitration Act.[v]
A Short Evolution
Bhatia International vs Bulk Trading S. A. & Anr. (2002) allowed Indian courts to step into foreign seated arbitrations, this created years of jurisdictional overreach.
That is until the landmark case of BALCO (2012) corrected the course, it held that ‘part I’ of the 1996 act applies only when the seat of arbitration is India. It explicitly overruled Bhatia and rejected the notion of concurrent jurisdiction between the “seat” court and court mentioned in the contract separately.
Later, in 2014 Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH introduced the “closest connection” test that required courts to weigh multiple factors to identify the seat which had the most closest connection with the arbitration; this however led to exactly the kind of open-ended litigation that the seat concept was supposed to prevent.
This was corrected by way of a trio of decisions that followed thereafter,
- In 2017 the supreme court in Indus Mobile Distribution Private Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd held that once parties designate a seat, that designation operates on its own as an exclusive jurisdiction.
- In 2019, Brahmani River Pellets v. Kamachi Industries extended this logic to a clause that named only a “venue”, holding that a clearly designated venue, without any real indication of a different seat, should itself be treated as the seat.
- In the same year, the Hon’ble court in BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC consolidated this position, cautioning against reading BALCO’s observations as rigid formulae and reaffirming that a designated venue absent contrary indicator is the seat.
Different Scenarios, Different Outcomes
- Seat is clear, no contradictions:
In this scenario, the seat is specifically mentioned and the jurisdiction clause points to the same city, no ambiguity present.
Indus mobile, had a similar clause, wherein the arbitration clause named Mumbai as the seat and also specifically mentioned that “the jurisdiction was to exclusively vest in Mumbai courts” leading to no confusion at all, herein the Hon’ble court ruled that once the seat is designated it is equivalent to an exclusive jurisdiction clause.
Similarly in BGS SGS soma it was observed that where the contract specifies jurisdiction of the court at particular place, in this case, Bhubaneshwar, then only that court will have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter and to that extent will be treated as the seat for the matter.
Hence, where the seat and the jurisdiction clause point to the same city, courts read them as reinforcing each other rather than raising any conflict.
- Seat is mentioned in the contract, but a separate jurisdiction clause pointing elsewhere also exists:
In this scenario even though the seat is specified in the contract, the jurisdiction clause points towards a conflicting/different court having the jurisdiction, this clause could be of two types:
- Jurisdiction clause outside the scope of arbitration –
In KLA Const. Technologies v. Gulshan Homz (2025), the Delhi High Court held that the seat determines jurisdiction, and this holds with even greater force where the jurisdiction clause is itself made expressly to fall outside the scope of arbitration.
In essence, this means that in a situation where the exclusive jurisdiction clause is not covered under the purview of arbitration clause, the mentioned seat prevails.
- Jurisdiction clause specifically governing arbitration-
The above rule, however, admits a meaningful exception: wherein the conflicting clause is not jurisdiction clause but one that specifically governs arbitration-related proceedings, courts have allowed it to override the seat clause. In both CARS24 Services v. Cyber Approach Workspace (2020) and Hunch Circle v. Future Times Technology India (2022), the Delhi High Court ruled that jurisdiction for arbitrator appointment and enforcement was to be Haryana courts in lieu of the exclusive jurisdiction clause specifically tied to arbitration that gave Haryana courts the exclusive jurisdiction, despite New Delhi being the stated seat.
The determinative factor, therefore, is not the mere existence of a conflicting jurisdiction clause, but whether that clause is generic or is specific to arbitral proceedings and forms part of the arbitration clause itself. Only the latter displaces the seat’s presumptive control over jurisdiction.
- Only a venue or place is named, and a generic jurisdiction clause conflicts with it
In this scenario the issue is whether contrary exclusive jurisdiction clause would prevail over the presumption that the venue/place is the juridical seat or vice-versa.
- Venue prevails over generic jurisdiction clause-
The Delhi high court in this respect, in the seminal case of Raman Deep Singh Taneja v. Crown Realtech (P) Ltd (2017 SCC OnLine Del 11966) gave precedence to venue of arbitration over exclusive jurisdiction, it further held that when disputes are to be resolved outside the scope of arbitration the exclusive jurisdiction may apply, however when arbitration is the chosen method for dispute resolution then the venue would prevail.
The same has been relied on upon by Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. v. Madhyanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd., (2023 SCC OnLine Del 4894), in holding that a generic exclusive jurisdiction clause does not override the choice of venue exercised by the parties. This position, further finds support in Yassh Deep Builders v. Sushil Kumar Singh [ (2023) 2 HCC (Del) 69], which observed that an exclusive jurisdiction clause can override the venue designated in an arbitration clause only where it is expressly incorporated within the arbitration clause itself, and not where it exists as a separate, standalone clause elsewhere in the agreement. The Bench further explained that the exclusive jurisdiction clause is applicable only if the parties decide to exclude themselves from the arbitration agreement or if the dispute is not covered by the arbitration clause.[vi]
More recently in 2025, the Delhi High Court reaffirmed this position, holding that where an arbitration clause specifies a “venue” for the conduct of the proceedings, that venue is to be treated as the “seat” of arbitration vesting supervisory jurisdiction in the courts of that seat. Crucially, the Court also held that a generic exclusive jurisdiction clause, one that does not specifically refer to arbitration-related proceedings cannot serve as “contrary indicia” to displace this presumption; it does not suffice to show that the designated place was merely a “venue” and not the “seat” of arbitration.[vii]
- a conflicting jurisdiction clause can defeat the venue-as-seat presumption
A contrary line of authority however exists in this regard. In Kush Raj Bhatia v. DLF Power and Services Ltd., the High Court of Delhi took the view that if the parties confer exclusive jurisdiction on the courts at a different place from the designated venue, it serves as a contraindication that the chosen place of arbitration was merely the venue and not intended to be the seat of arbitration. This view has also been endorsed by another coordinate bench in Meenakshi Nehra Bhat v. Wave Megacity Centre (P) Ltd.32.
It bears noting that both decisions were rendered in 2022 before the 2025 ruling in Moonwalk Infra Projects (discussed above), which took the opposing position that a generic exclusive jurisdiction clause cannot, on its own, function as contrary indicia.
The two lines of authority thus sit in direct tension; given its recency, Moonwalk however arguably reflects the current, more persuasive position.
- No seat, venue or place has been mentioned in the contract and only an exclusive jurisdiction clause exists.
Now in this case, there are 2 possible scenarios:
- Where the exclusive jurisdiction clause is incorporated within the arbitration clause-
Courts have taken a fairly consistent line here, if the jurisdiction clause sits inside the same clause that provides for arbitration rather than in a separate part of the contract, it gets read as a seat designation, even if the words “seat” or “venue” never appear.
The Supreme Court in Activitas Management Advisor v. Mind Plus Healthcare (2025) held that even though the clause did not specifically use the expressions “seat” or “venue”, the word “jurisdiction” is mentioned in the context of resolution of dispute through arbitration and hence this jurisdiction clause shall be understood in the context of arbitration and therefore the seat of arbitration must be as that of mentioned in the said jurisdiction clause.
- Where the exclusive jurisdiction clause is a standalone/generic clause-
Now this differs from the above, as the exclusive jurisdiction clause herein is generic in nature, i.e. is not part of the arbitration clause.
In Swastik Gases Private Limited v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited, the Supreme Court held that an exclusive general jurisdiction clause designates the legal seat or forum for arbitration, even if the arbitration clause itself is silent on the seat. The Court inferred that naming one city’s courts implicitly excludes all other jurisdictions. The bench ruled that when parties designate a specific court’s jurisdiction in a contract, their clear intention is to oust the jurisdiction of other competent courts. B.E. Simoese Von Staraburg Niedenthal v. Chhattisgarh Investment followed Swastik Gases on near-identical facts, wherein goa was conferred exclusive jurisdiction based on a clause that stipulated “that the courts at goa shall have exclusive jurisdiction”.
However, Kings Chariot v. Tarun Wadhwa (2024), went the other way on strikingly similar facts. Herein, the arbitration clause was silent on seat/venue and the contracts merely stated “all disputes subject to Delhi jurisdiction”. The Delhi High Court called it a general jurisdictional clause that “cannot be read to define the seat or venue”, and held that jurisdiction must be determined as per Sections 16–20 of CPC.[viii]
Bvg India v. Nagar Nigam Jaipur Greater (2025 SCC OnLine Del 7826) does little to resolve this tension. It upheld a generic Jaipur jurisdiction clause, but only because the tender, execution, and dispute all independently arose in Jaipur, so the CPC analysis and the jurisdiction clause pointed the same way. It doesn’t tell us what happens when they diverge.
Therefore, we may conclude that a generic exclusive jurisdiction clause prevails only when supported by the facts of the case and cause of action arising in that jurisdiction, otherwise CPC principles governs the jurisdiction when the jurisdiction clause is generic.
- No seat, venue, place or jurisdiction is mentioned.
In such a blank slate scenario we further observe two possibilities-
- Before any tribunal exists, who to approach for section 11 appointment?
At this pre-arbitral stage there is, by definition, no tribunal yet to exercise the Section 20(2)[ix] power. So the court being approached under Section 11[x] has nothing contractual to fall back on, and as Kings Chariot v. Tarun Wadhwa confirmed, has to apply ordinary CPC Sections 16-20 territorial-jurisdiction principles: where the defendant resides/carries on business, where the contract was executed, where obligations were to be performed, where the cause of action arose. This is the only scenario where civil procedure genuinely governs an arbitration-related application from the outset, because there is no seat-equivalent concept to displace it.
- Once a tribunal is constituted
Once an arbitrator is in place, Section 20(2) hands the seat-fixing power to the tribunal itself, “having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the convenience of the parties”. In practice tribunals weigh: where the parties/witnesses/evidence are located, the neutrality of the location relative to both sides, availability of arbitration infrastructure, and the nature of the dispute (e.g., a construction dispute may pull towards the site). In the case of BBR Pvt. Ltd. vs. S.P. Singla [ (2023) 1 SCC 693], the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in the absence of a designated ‘venue’ or ‘seat’ of arbitration in the agreement, the determining factor will be the cause of action. Consequently, the court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arose will have control over the arbitral proceedings.
Conclusion
From what we have observed above, two threads run through all six scenarios. First, specificity beats generality; a jurisdiction clause that is written into the arbitration clause and expressly addresses arbitration-related proceedings carries more weight than a generic jurisdiction clause which rarely displaces a clearly designated seat or venue. Second, every one of these disputes exists because a contract left seat, venue or jurisdiction unstated, or said it three different ways in three different clauses. The safest drafting practice hence, remains the most obvious one: name the seat expressly, make the venue match it (or explain why it doesn’t), and if a jurisdiction clause is meant to track the seat, say so in the same breath rather than leaving two lawyers, years later, to argue about it.
It is clear hence, how the seat, venue, place and jurisdiction interplay has evolved over time and is ever evolving, while courts have attempted to find specific and concrete solutions there still remains litigation that stems from unique and idiosyncratic terms of the arbitration agreement. Ultimately, we understand that these complex disputes may be solved efficiently if arbitration clauses are drafted with clarity keeping in mind the clear distinctions between the terms used in the contract.
[i] The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §20.
[ii] Bharat Aluminium Co ltd. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : 2012 (2012) 3 Arb LR 514 (SC).
[iii] Bharat Aluminium Co ltd. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : 2012 (2012) 3 Arb LR 514 (SC).
[iv] Merriam-Webster. (n.d.). Jurisdiction. In Merriam-Webster.com dictionary. Retrieved July 31, 2026, from https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/jurisdiction.
[v] Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy, 176th Report on the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2001, LCI 1, 272 (2001), https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s3ca0daec69b5adc880fb464895726dbdf/uploads/2022/08/2022081036.pdf
[vi] Yassh Deep Builders v. Sushil Kumar Singh, (2023) 2 HCC (Del) 69.
[vii] Moonwalk Infra Projects (P) Ltd. v. S.R Constructions, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 2797.
[viii] The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, §16-20.
[ix] The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §20(2).
[x] The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §11.